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MEMORANDUM OF NEWLY 
> UNCOVERED AUTHORITY 
Case Nos. 20995 and 
Category No. 13.b. 
21063 
The plaintiff-appellant cites as newly uncovered 
authority the case of Strahler v. St. LukeTs Hospital, 706 
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986). Strahler, a nineteen-year old 
plaintiff, alleged that she had received negligent medical 
treatment four years prior to filing the suit. ][d. at 8. 
Missouri law barred action against any health care provider 
unless brought within two years of the date of occurrence. 
The statute protected the claims of infants until their 
tenth birthday when the statute began to run. _Id. In 
Missouri, minors lack capacity to institute, civil lawsuits 
in their own right. Id. at 9. The Missouri Constitution 
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provides that "the courts of justice shall be open to every 
person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to 
person. . ." Mo. Const., art. I, §14. 
The Court found that minors have a constitution-
ally protected right of access to the Court even though 
their parents or guardians may fail to protect the child !s 
interests. I^ d. at 11. This is the argument made by Appel-
lant at Point I of his Brief and Point I of his Reply Brief. 
The Court states that "the method employed by the 
[Missouri] legislature to battle any escalating economic and 
social costs connected with medical malpractice litigation 
exacts far too high a price from minor plaintiffs like Carol 
Strahler and all other minors similarly situated." I_d. The 
appellant argues identically at Point II of his Brief and 
Points II and III of his Reply Brief. 
DATED this 11 day of //u* r 1986. 
ROBERTAJ. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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following: 
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Elliot J. Williams, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Esq. 
MARTINEAU 
84110 
3 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE 
GARZA, through his 
guardian, SUZANNE LEE, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 1 
DR. LYNN GAUFIN, 
Defendant-
Respondent, 
I Case No. 20995 
i and 
1 Case No. 21063 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Elliot J. Williams, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
David M. Jorgensen 
Robert J. DeBry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
AS APPLIED TO MINORS, 
SECTION 78-14-4 VIOLATES 
THE OPEN COURTS-INJURY REDRESS 
PROVISION OF UTAH' S CONSTITUTION 5 
POINT II: 
AUTHORITIES DIRECTLY ON POINT HOLD 
SIMILAR STATUTES TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER OPEN COURT PROVISIONS 
POINT III: 
AS APPLIED TO MINORS, SECTION 78-14-4 
DOES NOT SATISFY UTAH'S RATIONAL 
BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION TEST 11 
POINT IV: 
UNDER UTAH'S CONSTITUTION, THE RIGHT 
TO BRING A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION IS 
A RIGHT THAT IS ENTITLED TO HEIGHTENED 
EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW 14 
CONCLUSION 17 
APPENDIX 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED Page 
Arneson v. Olsen, 
270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) 5,17 
Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital for 
Magna Copper Company, 692 P.2d 280, 
(Ariz. 1984) 6,10 
Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp, 
25 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 5,6,7, 
8,10, 
11,14 
Boucher v. Sayeed, 
459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) 5,13 
Bracken v. Dahle, 
251 P. 16 (Utah 1926) 14 
Carson v. Maurer, 
424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) 15 
Hunter v. North Mason High School, 
529 P.2d 898 (1974), aff'd 539 P.2d 
845 (Wash. 1975) 13 
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 
555 P.2d 399 (Id. 1976) 16,17 
Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, (Utah 1984) 5,7, 
11,12, 
13 
Mills v. Habluetzel, 
456 U.S. 91 (1982) 15 
Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) 8,12 
Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) 15 
Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971) 15 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, (1973) 14 
ii 
Page 
Sax v. Votteler, 
648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) 8,11 
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 
568 P.2d 746, (Utah 1977) 10,13 
Stone v. Department of Registration, 
567 P.2d 1115, (1977) 7 
Switzer v. Reynolds, 
606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) 8,12 
Szaval v. Sandoval, 
636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981) 8,12 
Tafoya v. Doe, 
670 P.2d 582 (N.M. App. 1983) 13 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) 
Section 78-14-4 1 
Section 78-14-4.5 7 
Section 78-14-12 7 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 17 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Jenkins, California's Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act on Equal 
Protection Challenge, 52 So. Cal. 
L.Rev. 829, 960-961 (1979) 6,11 
iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. As applied to minors, does Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as amended) violate the Open 
Courts provision contained in Article I, Section 11, of the 
Utah Constitution. 
2. As applied to minors, does Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as amended) violate the equal 
protection guarantee contained in Article I, Section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
3. Does Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as 
amended) violate either the due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution or the equal protection clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Through his guardian, plaintiff-appellant, Nathan 
Lee Garza, seeks review of a ruling by Judge Cullen 
Christensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court granting 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss his claims. The trial court 
ruled that Nathan fs suit was not timely filed under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-4 (1953, as 
amended). 
FACTS 
Nathan Lee Garza was not even a year old when his 
mother first took him to Dr. Lynn Gaufin, a neurologist (R. 
29). Dr. Gaufin saw Nathan on August 13, 1980, August 29, 
1980, and October 24, 1980, for shaking spells (R. 13). Dr. 
Gaufin diagnosed Nathan's condition as encephalomyelitis 
(R. 29) . 
About nine months after his first visit to Dr. 
Gaufin, another physician told plaintiff's mother that 
Nathan had hydrocephalus, not encephalomyelitis (R. 30) . 
Hydrocephalus, or water on the brain, is treatable if caught 
in time (R. 87). 
But by the time plaintiff's condition was 
correctly diagnosed and treated, pressure from the hydro-
cephalus had already caused brain damage (R. 30, 87). 
Because Dr. Gaufin failed to properly diagnose and treat 
plaintiff, Nathan is now retarded and will be handicapped 
for life (R. 31, 87). He is now six years old (R. 30). 
Nathan's father left the family when he realized 
the extent of Nathan's handicap (R. 30). Nathan's mother, 
Suzanne Lee, had to work to provide for her family. She 
bore the burden of caring for Nathan and his younger brother 
alone. 
Mrs. Lee began the malpractice process by filing a 
Notice of Claim on May 6, 1983 (R. 12, 30). Under the 
discovery rule, this filing may have been timely. But, 
because of all the pressure she was under, Mrs. Lee 
instructed her attorneys to discontinue the litigation (R. 
30, 33). They complied. New attorneys served a new notice 
on November 9, 1984 (R. 12). This action was filed on March 
8, 1985 (R. 4). 
Defendant moved to dismiss Nathan's claims based 
upon the two-year statute of limitations and four-year stat-
ute of repose set forth in Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. The trial court granted the motion (R. 71-74). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Medical Malpractice Act's short 2-year Statute 
of Limitations is not tolled during minority. All other 
statutes of limitations are tolled for minors. The Medical 
Malpractice Act's short four-year statute of repose is not 
tolled for minority either. Consequently, the Medical 
Malpractice Act takes away the rights of those minors whose 
guardians do not act quickly for them to recovery for their 
injuries. 
The Open Court's provision in our State's Consti-
tution seeks to preserve the basic notion that one who 
inflicts injury ought to be responsible for the damage he 
causes. Under that provision, common law rights cannot be 
totally taken away without providing a substitute unless 
there is a showing of real need and a showing that the means 
used to meet that need is reasonable and appropriate. It is 
not necessary to preserve medical care to take away the 
right of a minor to recover for medical malpractice. In 
addition, the multitude of special legislation which exists 
to deal with the alleged medical malpractice crisis proves 
that less drastic steps can be taken. 
Minors in medical malpractice cases are treated 
differently than all other injured minors. This discrimi-
nation violates the equal protection provisions of Utah's 
Constitution. Any positive benefit which such discrimination 
would have to the medical profession as a whole is so tenu-
ous that this particular form of discrimination cannot 
withstand even the most minimum equal protection standard. 
The legislation certainly could not withstand the higher 
scrutiny given the rights which have some Constitutional 
status. Under our State's Constitutionf the right to 
recover for one's injuries is such a right. 
Minors are also treated differently than adults in 
the medical malpractice context. Adults have a discovery 
period. Unless someone takes action for them, young minors 
do not have a real discovery period. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
AS APPLIED TO MINORS, 
SECTION 78-14-4 VIOLATES THE OPEN 
COURTS-INJURY REDRESS PROVISION OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTION 
Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp. , 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 
30 held that Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
places meaningful restrictions on the legislature's power. 
Specifically, Berry held that legislation which abrogates a 
common law right without creating an adequate substitute is 
unconstitutional unless "there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of a remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objection." Id at 36. 
Given the court's holding in Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 
supra and the court's comment in MaIan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 
671 (Utah 1984) on the propriety of premium reduction as a 
justification for disparate treatment of classes, legislation 
abrogating the right to bring an action to reduce premiums 
would not be valid, at least absent a finding that insurance is 
not available at prices which make an affected business sector 
viable. Even thenf the means chosen needs to be examined for 
reasonableness and the lack of less drastic alternatives. 
Justice has its cost. The notion of fundamental justice is 
interwoven into the fabric of our society and our State 
Constitution. Before cutting premiums can become a legitimate 
reason for eliminating the right to maintain an action for 
one's injuries, something significantly more than a mere desire 
to reduce premiums must be shown. 
Because the issues in this case can be resolved on 
other grounds, there is probably no need to reach the issue. 
But it is not without significance that Arneson v. Olsen, 270 
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) and Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 
1983) found that no medical malpractice insurance crisis 
existed during the relevant time period. 
At least as applied to minors, the non-tolling 
requirement and statute of repose in Section 78-14-4 violate 
Article I, Section 11 of Utah's Constitution. Rule 17 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prevents minors from 
filing suit on their own behalf. Of course, young children 
are inherently unable to comprehend their legal rights. By 
imposing additional restrictions on top of a minor's mental 
and legal disabilities, Utah's Medical Malpractice Act 
effectively abrogates the common law right a minor has to 
recover for personal injuries unless that minor is fortunate 
enough to have a guardian who effectively pursues the claim 
for him. Section 78-14-4 thereby closes the courthouse door 
to the very people that need the law's protection the most. 
As applied to minors, neither the Medical 
Malpractice Act's anti-tolling provision nor the four year 
statute of repose satisfy the test which Berry v. Beach 
Aircraft set for statutes which effectively abrogate a 
person's common law right. Studies show that less that 
one-seventh (1/7) of all medical malpractice claims involve 
minors. Jenkins, California's Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act on Equal Protection Challenge, 52 So. Cal. L.Rev. 
829, 960-961 (1979). Those same studies show that 90% of 
all medical malpractice claims are discovered within four 
years. (Ld.) Courts have recognized that most claims of 
minors will be brought quickly. Barrio v. San Manuel 
Division Hospital for Magna Copper Company, 692 Pe2d 280, 
286 (Ariz. 1984). Obviously, any effect that the 
"long-tail" claims of minors have on the medical profession 
would be de minimus. There certainly has been no showing 
that a minor's long-tail claims have a meaningful effect on 
the medical industry as a whole in Utah. 
As recent history has shown, there is no shortage 
3 
of alternative ways to deal with the alleged crisis. 
Other alleged reasons for this devastating 
treatment of minors have been advanced by an articulate 
industry. But the test set forth in Berry v. Beach Aircraft 
is a strict weighing test. Reasons need to be examined for 
merit and weighed against fundamental justice. 
For example, defendant has argued that the statute 
of repose is needed to prevent fraud and situations where 
critical evidence may have been lost over time. But that 
does not significantly distinguish medical malpractice claims 
To the extent that there is any increase in premiums at 
allf that increase will likely be offset, at least in 
catastrophic cases, by increases in welfare. The net effect to 
the tax-paying, bill paying public will be even more de minimus 
than any conjectural effect on premiums. 
3 These include the abolition of the collateral source rule 
(Section 78-14-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, adopted in 1985), and 
the prelitigation review panel (Section 78-14-12, adopted in 
1985) , as well as the recent more controversial enactments. 
Not only do these changes show that there are alternatives to 
eliminating claims altogether, they also show that the legal 
climate has changed since Section 78-14-4 was enacted. Such 
changes may be considered in considering the constitutionality 
of older legislation. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 
1984); Stone v. Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1117 
(1977) . 
from all other types of claims. Moreover, it is plaintiff's 
burden to prove the facts. The lost records and faded 
memories are as important to the victim as they are to the 
doctor. Significantly, this court has consistently ruled 
that the stale claims considerations are outweighed by the 
unfair effect which the total elimination of rights can have 
on a minor. Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980); 
Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981); see also 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
II 
AUTHORITIES DIRECTLY ON POINT HOLD SIMILAR 
STATUTES TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER OPEN COURT PROVISIONS 
Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) 
applied the same test set forth in Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 
supra to invalidate a similar anti-tolling provision in that 
state's medical malpractice legislation. Under Texas1 Open 
Court's Provision, the Court declared that the anti-tolling 
provision was unreasonable and that the child's right to 
justice outweighed the legislation's purposes. Addressing 
the argument that parents will adequately protect the 
child's right, the court stated: 
This Court, however, cannot assume that 
parents will act in such a manner. It 
is neither reasonable nor realistic to 
rely on parents, who may themselves be 
minors, or who may be ignorant, 
lethargic, or lack concern, to bring a 
malpractice suit within the time 
provided. 
(648 S.W.2d 661 at 667) . 
The facts of this case illustrate how apt such 
reasoning is. Nathan's father left when he understood the 
extent of his handicap (R. 30). His mother, who had to bear 
the burden of caring for the family alone, could not stand 
the pressure and instructed attorneys to drop the case. 
(R. 30, 33). 
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed that a guardian's 
ability to bring a child's claim for him is not an adequate 
safeguard. Invalidating the part of Arizona's medical 
malpractice act which required minors injured before age 
seven to bring their action before they were ten, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
We are well aware that where a chance of 
substantial recovery exists, there is no 
lack of advocates willing to undertake 
appropriate procedures to find and 
appoint a guardian ad litem or to obtain 
a "next friend" so that the action may 
be brought. While the vast majority of 
claims on behalf of injured minors will 
still be brought within a relevantly 
short time after the injury occurs, this 
all depends upon good fortune; the minor 
himself is helpless, particularly when 
under ten years of age. The minor 
possesses a right guaranteed by the 
constitution, but cannot assert it 
unless someone else, over whom he has no 
control, learns about it, understands 
it, is aware of the need to take prompt 
action, and in fact takes such action. 
We recognize, also, that some children 
are without parents or have parents who 
do not fulfill commonly accepted 
parental functions. The statute makes 
no exception for children who have 
unconcerned parents, children in foster 
care, or those in institutions; . . . 
9 
As to parents themselves, some are lazy 
or frightened or ignorant or religiously 
opposed to legal redress. Still, they 
have their remedy available to them if 
they choose to use it* The child does 
not. 
Barrio v. San Manuel Division 
Hospital for Magna Copper Co., 692 P.2d 
280, 2985-296 (Ariz* 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the argument 
that the minor can be represented by a guardian is similar. 
Ruling that the general tolling provisions for minority had 
to be applied to the Governmental Immunity Act's Notice of 
Claims provision, the Court stated: 
The parents or natural guardians have no 
specific legal duty to perform and have 
no responsibility to their minor 
offspring other than their moral 
obligation. Consequently, in matters of 
this kind, when a parent, natural 
guardian fails, for one reason or 
another to give notice, file suit, or 
otherwise protect the minor's legal 
interests, the minor is left completely 
without a remedy. 
Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 
1977) . 
This Court then stated that any ruling prohibiting 
the general tolling provisions for minority from applying to 
the notice of claim requirement would work "a denial of due 
process and equal protection." Ixi. at 568. Since Article 
I, Section 11, has been interpreted as giving a degree of 
substantive due process protection, presumably, this is one 
of the provisions that the court had in mind. 
In any event, Berry v. Beach Aircraft, supra which 
invalidated our products liability statute of repose held 
that Article I, Section 11 limits legislative power to 
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action. Berry and Sax v. Votteler, supra, shows that the 
anti-tolling requirement and the imposition * ? - statute 
of repose in Section ' 78 ] 4 ! lui in<| mi I «it tj 
Article 1, Section 1 ] of Utah1s Constitution. 
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AS APPLIED TO MINORS, 
SECTION 78-14-4 DOES NOT SATISFY 
UTAH'S RATIONAL BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION TEST 
Malai i y Lewis „ "• i 1 11 111 I I ill . i 11 1r* 8 4 I < ie t i n e d 
Utahfs equal protection rational basis test. Malan held 
that classifications must reasonably promote legitimate 
• ,'. i " ' h |».'i !• i \ ' i ' - Malan 
that classifications under u. . * - ^nl^ u^ subject 
Tor the purposes of this case, the Court need not decide 
whether the statute of repose in its entirety is 
unconstitutional. The Court need only decide whether its bar 
can be applied during a victim's minority. But the four year 
medical malpractice statute is more discriminatory than the six 
year products liability statute. About 10% of the potential 
medical malpractice claims are not even discovered by the end 
of that period. Jenkins, California's Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act on Equal Protection Analysis, 52 So. 
Cal. L.Rev. 829, 960-961 (1979). It then takes time to decide 
to go to an attorney. Because medical malpractice claims are 
fiercely resisted and costly to prosecute, it takes even more 
time for an attorney to decide to bring such an action. 
Unlike most products liability claims, medical 
malpractice claims inherently require some discovery period, 
especially to discover the "legal injury," Like some products, 
some forms of medical malpractice will take time before even 
the physical injury manifests itself. The shorter four years 
statute i s then imposed upon a shortened statute of 
limitations, a bewildering array of procedural necessities and 
substantive changes to the common law. 
degree of judicial scrutiny. That case expressly stated 
that it is unconstitutional to single out a group "on the 
basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no 
merit." (JLd. at 671.) Section 78-14-4 discriminates 
between children injured by health care providers and 
children injured by all other tort-feasors. As has been 
discussed, the relationship between the Act's alleged 
purposes and this discrimination is "tenuous" and of "little 
or no merit." 
The Utah Supreme Court has already demonstrated 
its belief that the "stale claim" argument should not stand 
in the way of justice. Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P. 2d 244 
(Utah 1980); Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981); 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). Significantly, 
Ma Ian rejected a fraudulent claims argument applying the 
equal protection rational basis test. Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 674 (Utah 1984). 
The legislation also discriminates between adults injured 
by medical malpractice and children who have medical 
malpractice claims. The discrimination is subtle but real. 
Under the statute, adults are given a period of time to 
"discover" their legal injury for themselves and to take 
appropriate action. 
In reality, children cannot "discover" their injury 
because they cannot comprehend it. If they are young enough 
and no one takes action for them, they have no discovery 
period. 
The act also provides exceptions to the two-year 
statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose when 
there is a foreign body and when there is concealment. The 
failure to give minors a similar exception itself violates 
equal protection. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, 673 (Utah 
1984). 
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legislation that has been enacted The need to d i sci: i in :i nate 
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premiums hammers that point home. 
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 
discriminatory treatment oi y.,n< . ^iate- i ia* equal 
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Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A. 2d 87 (R.I. 1983) utilized the 
rational basis test to find Rhode Island's entire Malpractice 
Act unconstitutional, apparently on the grounds that the 
alleged crisis was not significant. 
IV 
UNDER UTAH'S CONSTITUTION, THE RIGHT 
TO BRING A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION IS A RIGHT 
THAT IS ENTITLED TO HEIGHTENED EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW 
The United States Supreme Court has held that 
satutes affecting rights "explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution" are tested under the strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection purposes, San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S, 
1, 33-34 (1973). To be sure, the right to bring a personal 
injury action is not a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution. But, applying the same basic test under our 
State's Constitution would result in a heightened equal 
protection scrutiny. The right to bring a personal injury 
claim is protected under Utah's Constitution. 
Years ago, the Utah Supreme Court characterized 
the right to bring a tort claim as a "substantial right." 
Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16 (Utah 1926). The Court's recent 
decision in Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., supra, confirms 
the fact that common law tort rights are of Constitutional 
dimensions in Utah. The equal protection test when such 
rights are affected should not be less stringent than the 
test applied under Article I, Section 11 of Utah's 
Constitution. 
WlirH ' 1 h'l i '"'iii't scrutiny f-ps^-" » 
"scrutiny" test something 1 n between is not a decisive 
issue. Under ar- heightened atdndaicl "| review, the 
disci xiiiLi'idting efiec*. which Section 7 l-l 14-4 lias ...n minors 
cannot stand. 
Using an intermediat * ~\r-* 
Supreme Court in Carson v. Maurer, * - . * N i 980) 
invalidated the part ol a men- i' n-alpract * a - wr : "h 
- . . ,.,.*. .oris ior m i n o r - a :, -. a p p l y *•. medical 
malpractice claims. Although *• .•: t declare *n^ right 
•' - |'M , . - 1 
right . * ^.-u: • : characterized such a r:i ght as an "important 
substantive right™ which i s "sufficiently important o 
I e 
subjected to a more rigorous judical scrutiny than allowed 
7 
Under the United States Constitution, the "strict 
scrutiny test" requires that the classification be necessary to 
promote a compelling that interest Plyler y. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
217 (1982) . The middle level or "scrutiny" test is whether the 
classification is substantially related to a legitimate 
government interest. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (] 971). 
8 The Utah Supreme Court has not decided whether children 
are a "discreet and insular" minority justifying treatment 
under some form of heightened scrutiny. In illegitimacy cases, 
the United States Supreme Court has given middle level scrutiny 
to legislation affecting minors. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 
91 (1982). The combination of minority plus the importance of 
education triggered the middle-level "scrutiny" test in Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Such cases indicate that the U.S. 
Supreme Court is really applying a sliding scale analysis to 
equal protection challenges though a majority has yet to admit 
as much. If that right to bring a personal injury action by 
(Footnote Continued) 
under the rational basis teste" (Icl. at 830.) In deter-
mining the constitutionality of New Hampshire's Malpractice 
Act, the court applied the following test: 
Whether the malpractice statute can be 
justified as a reasonable measure in 
furtherance of the public interest 
depends upon whether the restriction of 
private rights sought to be imposed is 
not so serious that it outweighs the 
benefits sought to be conferred upon the 
general public. 
Ud. at 831.) 
Holding that elimination of the tolling provisions 
for a minor's medical malpractice claims did not satisfy 
that test, the court found that the discrimination did not 
substantially further the legislative objective because of 
the small number of claims that would be affected. It 
further held that the non-tolling provision unfairly bur-
dened medical malpractice claimants. (IcL. at 834.) 
Idaho used an intermediate "means-focusff test in 
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Id. 1976) to 
determine the constitutionality of Idaho's medical malprac-
tice legislation. Before remanding the case for factual 
findings, the Supreme Court held that the intermediate 
means-focus test should be applied for equal protection 
analysis. On remand, the District Court held, the special 
statute of limitations applicable to minors 
(Footnote Continued) 
itself is not enough to trigger a higher standard of equa] 
protection review, the combination fo the right plus minority 
should under our State Constitution. 
I inconst i tuti : i ia ] Jones v, state Board of Medicine , Nos. 
55527 & 55586 (4th Di 31 : Idaho 1980). 
1 n
 Arneson > . Olson , 270 N. W 2d ] 25 (N. I) ] 97 8) , 
the Nor tl i Dakota Supreme Cour t str uck down that state '" s 
entire malpractice act , The cour t i n Arneson utilized the 
intermediate test for equal protection analysis. 
For the reasons stated in the discussion on, the 
Malan rational basis test
 r the discriminatory effect wh i ch 
Section 78 • 14-4 has on minors won I < I in I v/1 t hst'.uul a IT; - ] evel 
of heightened scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
As applied to minors, the Medical Malpractice 
', •« " M I * . .• ^  I--.! n - • e 
unconstitutional. Those provisions ^ .o -ite r^ t* 'oen *.ou: r s 
declaration of the Utah Constitution a, it the orst - tutir.n * s 
li i IIMJI'I 1111 f i i u i H I i i i i ' I 11.1 i i r i in i ii<) I ii i ; , l i ' . g i s l a t j o i :i • i i o u t 
need anil in spite oi less drastic alten: latives, this special 
legislation violates important guarantees of fundamental 
fai rness Till: .€ E :ii s ti : 
The case should be remanded :onsider . ne merits. 
DATED this /r; day oi &/j* 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant part of section 7 8-14-4, Utah <1 ode 
Annotated, (J 953 as amended) reads as f^llows: 
malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of 
the alleged act, omission, neglect 
or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allega-
ta on against the health care 
provider is that a foreign object 
has been wrongfully left within a 
patient's body, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the existence of the 
foreign object wrongfully left in 
the patient's body, whichever first 
occurs; and, 
(b) In an action where it is 
alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering miscon-
duct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to 
fraudulent! y conceal tt le all leged 
misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section 
shall apply to all persons, 
regardless of minority or other 
legal disabilit y in 1 d e r S e c t i o n 
78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroac-
tively t .c a] 1 persons, partner-
ships, associations and corpora-
tions and to all health care 
providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care provid-
ers based upon alleged personal 
injuries which occurred prior to 
the effective date of this act; 
provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have 
been commenced after the effective 
date of this act may be commenced 
only within the unelapsed portion 
of time al lowed under former law; 
but any action which under former 
law could have been commenced more 
than four years after the effective 
date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the 
effective date of this act. 
SELECTED RELEVANT 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section " " f t* e Utah Consti tution 
reads as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel , any civil cause to 
which he i s a party. 
Article I, Section 24 of tl le Utah Constitution 
reads as f :: ,1 ] • :: ws : 
All laws of a general nature shal 1 
hav e i n li form, operations . 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Constitution of the United States of Airier i ca 
follows: 
A11 p e r s o n s b o r n o r n a t u r a 1 i z e d i i I 
the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due 
process of ] aw; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
